The numbers behind the identity crisis at Anfield
Liverpool registered a PPDA (Passes Per Defensive Action) of 13.8 during their collapse against Aston Villa. For context, the Liverpool of 2020 averaged 8.2. This single metric validates Jamie Carragher’s blunt assessment on Sky Sports that this squad simply does not excel at anything anymore.
When you stop pressing effectively, you have to be elite at something else. You either become a rigid defensive block or a high-possession team that controls the rhythm. Liverpool are currently caught in a tactical vacuum, succeeding at neither while being exposed by the physical intensity of teams like Villa.
The death of the high turnover
The hallmark of the modern Liverpool era was the high turnover—winning the ball within 40 meters of the opposition goal. In their title-winning seasons, they averaged 11.4 high turnovers per 90 minutes. Against Villa, that number dropped to 4, and none resulted in a shot on target.
Without that threat, opponents no longer fear playing out from the back. Villa’s center-backs were allowed to complete 92% of their passes in their own half. This lack of pressure forces Liverpool's midfield into a reactive state, chasing shadows rather than dictating the terms of the engagement.
The lack of intensity is not just an eye-test observation. The data shows Liverpool are covering 4.2km less per game than they were at the start of the 2025/26 season. They are slower to the second ball and slower to transition, which allows teams to set their defensive shape before Liverpool can penetrate.
The myth of midfield control
Carragher’s claim that Liverpool have too many weak players is supported by their duel success rates. In the loss to Villa, Liverpool’s midfield trio won only 38% of their total ground duels. If you cannot win your individual battles in the center of the pitch, your tactical structure is irrelevant.
This fragility has turned Liverpool into a 'transition-only' team that cannot actually handle the transition. They concede an average of 1.6 big chances per game from fast breaks. This is the highest figure for the club since the late Brendan Rodgers era, signaling a total breakdown in defensive recovery speed.
It is not just the defense that is struggling. Liverpool are currently averaging 1.42 goals per game from open play, their lowest return in a decade. They are relying on set pieces and moments of individual brilliance rather than a repeatable, data-driven offensive pattern.
Why the 4-3-3 is sagging into a 4-5-1
Tactically, the 4-3-3 is supposed to offer verticality. Instead, we are seeing a structure that sags into a passive 4-5-1 when out of possession. The triggers are late, and the distances between the units are too wide. Against Villa, the average distance between the defensive line and the forwards was 48 meters—nearly 10 meters wider than the league average.
This spacing is a gift to any team with technical midfielders. It allows the opposition to bypass the press with a single line-breaking pass. Villa exploited this 14 times in the first half alone, finding runners in the half-spaces that the Liverpool full-backs were too slow to cover.
The most damning statistic remains the 'Expected Goals Against' (xGA) per shot. Liverpool are allowing opponents to shoot from an average distance of 12.4 yards. They aren't just conceding chances; they are conceding high-quality, high-probability chances because they lack the physical presence to push opponents away from the box.
A surprising finding in the passing data
Perhaps the most counterintuitive discovery in the recent data is Liverpool’s backward passing rate. Despite being a team built for forward momentum, 22% of their passes in the final third are now being played backward. This indicates a lack of confidence and a lack of options between the lines.
The players are choosing the safe option because the riskier, progressive pass is no longer being supported by intelligent movement. When the off-the-ball runs stop, the passing lanes vanish. This is the 'weakness' Carragher is highlighting—a mental and physical fatigue that has led to a safety-first approach that contradicts the club’s DNA.
As we approach the final stretch of the season, the numbers suggest that a minor tactical tweak won't fix this. This is a structural failure. Liverpool are no longer the most intense team in the country, they aren't the best defensive unit, and they aren't the most clinical. Carragher is right: they don't excel at anything.
